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Similarities and differences will be demonstrated between Chinese and Hungarian party-state 
systems. We define the role of reforms in the self-reproduction of both party-states. We shall 
demonstrate how different patterns of power distribution lead to the implementation of 
different reforms.  We shall describe how these different reforms have created the Hungarian 
“Goulash communism” and the “Chinese style” reforms. We shall also explain the conditions 
that have lead “Goulash communism” to political transformation first in Hungary accompanied 
by economic crisis, and “Chinese style reforms” to economic transformation first in China, 
accompanied by macroeconomic growth. 
 




JEL: B52, D85, N10, P2, P3, P41, P52 
                                                        
1  This is the background paper of the presentation given at the conference “China’s Three Decades of Reform and 
Development:Global Perspective” organized by the East Asian Institute at the University of Singapore in November (7-8), 
2008.  The paper will be published as a book part of the conference volume in early 2009. We are grateful to the National 
Scientific Fund of Hungary for financing the project.  
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A "kínai típusú" reformok és a magyar 
"gulyáskommunizmus"
2 
 MÁRIA CSANÁDI 
Összefoglaló 
 
A  cikk  a  kínai  és  a  magyar  pártállamok  közötti  hasonlóságokat  és  eltéréseket  mutatja  be. 
Meghatározzuk a reformok szerepét mindkét pártállam újratermelődésében. Bemutatjuk, hogy 
milyen módon vezetnek az eltérő hatalmi eloszlások eltérő reformok alkalmazásához. Leírjuk, 
hogy ezek a reformok hogyan teremtették meg a magyarországi “gulyáskommunizmust” és a 
“kínai  stílusú”  reformokat.  Elmagyarázzuk  azokat  a  feltételeket,  amelyek  között  a 
gulyáskommunizmus  folyamatából  először  a  politikai  átalakulás  bontakozott  ki  és  azokat, 
amelyek között a kínai stílusú reformok először gazdasági átalakuláshoz vezettek.  
 
Tárgyszavak:  reformok,  átalakulás,  pártállami  rendszerek,  gulyáskommunizmus,  kínai 
stílusú reformok  
                                                        
2 Ez a cikk a 2008 novemberében (7 8), a University of Singapore East Asian Institute által szervezett “China’s Three Decades of 
Reform and Development: Global Perspective” című konferencia előadásának háttéranyaga. A kutatást az OTKA finanszírozta. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Hungarian reforms that started in the early 1960s providing relatively high living standards 
were  outstanding  among  party states.  No  wander  Hungarian  economic  system  was  nick 
named  as  „Goulash  communism”.  „Goulash  communism”  however,  ended  up  in  system 
collapse in 1989 and transformation accompanied by economic crisis, similar to all Eastern 
European  and  Soviet  party states.  Chinese  reforms  started  in  late  1970s  demonstrating  an 
uncontestable  economic  growth.  The  system  survived  the  Tiananmen  Square  tragedy  that 
occurred at the same time when system collapse swept all over Eastern Europe. Moreover, 
economic growth even accelerated some years after the political shock. Reforms that caused 
that  exuberant  development  were  viewed  as  strictly  connected  to  wisely  pursued  Chinese 
economic policy, thus nick named worldwide as “Chinese style reforms” that do not seem to 
follow the same tendency as those of its European counterparts.  
Was there anything in common at all between the Hungarian and the Chinese reforms?  
Tracing back in time to find the motivations of reform and their structural background we 
arrive  to  one  very  important  common  factor:  both  countries  were  operating  in  a  Stalinist 
centralized system in the 1950s and both countries suffered transitory system collapse that 
pre empted reforms.   
The character and motivation of these system collapses however was different. In Hungary, 
it was a sudden, abrupt event, initiated bottom up, due to the destabilization of the system and 
the weakening of the Hungarian Muscovite leadership in the aftermath of Stalin’s death in 
1953. The collapse, marked by the 1956 revolution, was short lived due to its clamp down by 
Soviet  military  intervention  and  fast  system  restoration.  In  China  a  series  of  transitory 
collapses were initiated top down due to Mao’s internal power struggles that ended up in two 
major  nation wide  mobilizing  and  decentralizing  campaigns.  These  campaigns  temporary 
paralyzed  the  operation  of  the  system  to  stabilize  personal  power  against  potential 
competitors. Differences occurred also in the motivations of the restoration and stabilization of 
the system in a modified power structure. In Hungary, restoration of the structure was based 
on the bitter experiences of an over centralized power concluding in revolution and thus, there 
was a strong drive to balance power to prevent another de stabilization. This motivation ended 
up integrating crucial economic interests in the centralized decision making process. In China, 
motivation was to decentralize the power structure toward provinces by integrating them in 
the decision making process in order to inhibit the de stabilization of Mao’s personal power by 
central power struggles.   
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Different patterns of power distribution however had several common traits: both diverged 
from  the  centralized  Stalinist  structure  of  the  1950s;  both  involuntary  integrated  strong 
resisting capacities to central interventions and resource attracting capacities in the decision 
making process; and both were based on the same basic system characteristics. 
In the next chapters, through the application of the Interactive party state model (IPS)
3 we 
shall  first  detail  the  common  system  characteristics,  and  second,  the  structural  basis  of 
different patterns of power distribution. We will show that these different patterns will attract 
different kind of instruments of resource extraction and distribution provided by the reforms, 
in  order to  reproduce  the  system. Next,  we  shall  demonstrate  that  these  different  ways  of 
working  will  end  up  in  different  ways  of  transformation.  Conclusions  will  follow  that 
dissimilarities of reforms are not the result of different strategic choices but have a structural 
basis within which strategic choices have the room for maneuver while interacting with the 
structure. 
                                                        
3 Maria Csanádi, Party-states and their Legacies in Post-communist Transformation (Cheltenham, UK,  Northampton, Ma, US: 
Edward Elgar, 1997); Maria Csanádi, Self-consuming Evolutions: A Model on the Structure, Self-reproduction, Self-destruction 
and Transformation of Party-state Systems Tested in Romania, Hungary and China (Budapest: Akademia Kiado, 2006).  
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1. SELF-SIMILARITIES OF PARTY-STATES 
The IPS model is based on the decision making process and the relationship of party , state , 
and economic decision makers during this process. The model defines three overlapping and 
intertwined layers of relationship among decision makers during the decision making process 
that form the party state structure:  
(1) First of all, there are two hierarchies: the party hierarchy monopolizing the political 
sub sphere and the state hierarchy with the state monopolized economy that allows for the 
monopolized extraction and distribution of resources (see Fig. 1)  
 
Figure 1.  
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(2) The two separate hierarchies are interlinked by the party’s instruments of power that 
infiltrate the boundaries of non party institutions and overlap the decision making process 
through  positional  structure,  activity  structure,  and  organizational  structure  and  through 
individual decision makers upon their party discipline
4. These interlinking dependency lines at 
the same time allow for the interest promotion of those embraced by them, introducing an 
inequality of interest promotion among decision makers attached to, and deprived of these 
lines (see Fig. 2).  
Figure 2.  




                                                        
4 These instruments of party power are for example: the well known nomenklatura system that infiltrates non party institutions 
and overlap decision making process through the positional structure; the subject matter responsibility system of the party that 
overlaps decision making process through activity structure; the instructor system that overlaps the decision making process 
through the organizational structure and the party discipline of individual party members, that overlaps decision making process 
directly through individual decision makers.  
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(3)  The  decision making  process  for  some  actors  may  be  short cut  both  within  each 
hierarchy  and  also  across  state to   party  hierarchy  by  having  the  chance  to  directly  or 
indirectly participate on higher level decision making. Short cuts form a structural feedback 
loop through either intra hierarchy or cross hierarchy dependency lines. Through feed backs a 
new structural inequality of interest promotion is introduced for those privileged by them, 
since actors at one level may meet decision makers of higher levels whom otherwise would 
never meet, thus, have access to information, are able to influence decisions, accumulate new 
short cuts and prepare to unavoidable impacts (see Fig. 3).  
Figure 3.  




The  two  hierarchies with  monopolized political  sub sphere,  and  monopolized  economic 
sub sphere, the interlinking lines and the feedbacks are the main elements of the party state 
structure.  These  elements  appear  in  three  intertwined  layers that  will  form  the  party state 
network. The structure reveals its principles of operation: since all actors hold hierarchical 
dependency lines but only actors in the party hierarchy hold dependency lines interlinking 
decision makers  in  all  other  sub spheres,  dependencies,  interest  promotion  and  resource 
extraction and allocation are directly or indirectly politically monopolized. 
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Consequently, the party, originally as one entity in one sub sphere (political), through its 
power  instruments  permeating  and  monopolizing  other  subfields  and  defining  its  internal 
inequalities, develops into a monopolized power network that functions as a social system 
(Fig. 4.)  
Figure 4.  




Structural and operational characteristics will provide the dynamics of self reproduction. 
Within  this  complex  social  structure  actors  are  in  dual  position:  they  are  simultaneously 
holders  of  and  captured  by  dependency  lines,  thereby  incorporating  two  functions 
simultaneously:  distributors  and  pleaders  in  one  single  entity.  The  dual  functions  will  be 
fuelled by dual structural motivations:  
￿  As monopolistic holders of the lines, they are able to intervene the decision 
making  process,  and  simultaneously  forced  to  intervene  since  there  are  no 
alternatives to intervention and thus, restraining from intervention, they would 
lose positions to other actors who will intervene  
  11 
￿   As embraced by these lines they are exposed and simultaneously interested in 
keeping  and  multiplying  monopolistic  dependency  threads  for  interest 
promotion and accommodate to expectations of those who intervene. Without 
alternative ways of interest promotion, non applying actors will lose bargaining 
position and chances for interest promotion to those who apply 
Consequently,  capacity  and  force,  exposure  and  interest  together  ensure  the  politically 
rational motivations of behavior for actors to reproduce bargaining status quo and thereby the 
cohesion and reproduction of the whole network.  
Owing to actors’ dual position and function, the capacity for self reproduction is complex: 
one single actor as holder of the lines (intervener) has resource extracting and redistributing 
capacity,  while  as  embraced  by  those  (pleader),  it  has  resource  attracting  capacities  and 
resisting capacities to interventions. These factors together will provide the constraints of the 
capacity for self reproduction of an actor.  
However,  constraints  of  this  capacity  are  not  uniform  to  all  actors,  since  positional 
differences due to built in inequalities – interlinking lines (D2, I2) and feedbacks (I3) – will 
forge selective chances (capacities) for resource attraction, extraction, allocation and resisting 
interventions.  Consequently,  this  will  lead  to  selectively  soft  or  hard  constraints  of  self 
reproduction according to the actors’ structural bargaining capacities. 
The above features are self similar in time, in space and in different aggregation levels and 
induce  self similar  behavior  and  interest  for  selection,  allocation.  Characteristics  of  self 
reproduction are leading to self similar traps of self consumption of the system. These self 
similar characteristics form the basis of comparison of the Chinese and Hungarian party states 
despite  so  many  individual  specifics  connected  to  size,  historical,  cultural,  economic, 
geographical, geopolitical differences. 
 
2. STRUCTURAL BACKGROUND OF THE DIFFERENT OPERATION OF PARTY-
STATES  
Despite  of  self similarities,  party states  operate,  reproduce  themselves  and  transform 
differently.  The IPS model offers a structural explanation of those differences. The structural 
background of differences is produced by the combination of the variations of constructing 
elements  while  keeping  principles  of  operation  unharmed.  That  is,  (1)  the  strictness  of 
decisions within the hierarchies, (2) the level of centralization or decentralization of discretions 
over  extraction  and  distribution  of  resources  along  the  state  hierarchy,  (3)  the  level  of 
centralization or decentralization of the discretion of holding  interlinking dependency lines 
along the party hierarchy, its density, its outreach and its depth in the place of outreach,  and  
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finally, (4) the  origin, the target, the density and the accumulation of feedbacks, be they within 
and/or across state party hierarchy.  
Figure 5.  




The combination of these varieties will provide the different distributions of power within 
the network, and, at the same time, define the scope of the space outside the net.  These wide  
ranging  power  distributions  may  be  grouped  into  three  characteristic  patterns.  Pattern 
specifics are defined by the above factors (discretion over extraction and allocation, discretion 
in  holding  interlinking  lines  and  accumulating  feedbacks).  These  three  patterns  will  have 
characteristic distributions of power that define resisting and resource attracting capacities 
within  the  structure,  characteristic  instruments  for  reproducing  the  power  structure,  and 
finally,  characteristic  ways  of  transformation.  The  Hungarian  and  Chinese  party state 
structures belong to two different patterns. Let us see the three patterns in detail. 
(i) The self-exploiting pattern: this pattern is the original type institutionalized by Stalin in 
the USSR, served as a blueprint to all party states from the end of the World War II until mid 
late 1950s, to several European, Central Asian republics still by the end of 1980s and presently 
to North Korea. In this pattern, the distribution of power is such that both the extraction and 
allocation of resources and the interlinking lines are centralized, and there are weak or none  
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economic feedbacks. These latter will mean weak resisting and attracting capacity within the 
network.  In  this  case,  the  whole  structure  has  unconstrained  extracting  capacity,  in  other 
words, its reproduction constraints are soft. Softness evolves and persists due to the fact that 
forced  resource  redeployment  (extraction  and  reallocation)  may  be  repeated  without 
meaningful resistance. Forceful restructuring will result in forced redeployment of resources or 
that of directly resourceful targets (subjects). We shall not detail this pattern, since this was 
characteristic to the Hungarian and Chinese structure in the 1950, which is not our present 
concern.  
The following two types of patterns describe the differences in the distribution of power in 
Hungary and China, that both stabilized after a transitory collapse of the former – Stalinist – 
structure. The process of institutionalization went on from 1957 to 1963 in Hungary and from 
1957 to 1976 in China. 
  (ii) The second pattern will be called self-disintegrating which is characteristic to the 
Hungarian  pattern  of  power  distribution  after  the  transitory  collapse  caused  by  the  1956 
revolution. Learning from the violent consequences of the overly centralized power and high 
speed of industrialization to the detriment of consumption, the new leadership wanted to have 
an  upper  hand  over  strategic  economic  interests  that  could  destabilize  the  system.  Both 
managers of larger enterprises and newly organized and merged agricultural cooperatives were 
integrated into the decision making process. Yet, this move did not only allow the authorities 
to  keep  strategic  interests  under  control,  but  also  built  up  stronger  bargaining  capacities 
through  feed backs.  In  the  stabilized  distribution  of  power  interlinking  threads  were 
overwhelmingly centralized, and so were extraction and distribution of resources, but with 
strong economic feedbacks within the net. Consequently, forced resource redeployment efforts 
become  form-fitted  to  specifics  of  power  relations  according  to  resisting  and  resource 
attracting  capacities  and  the  system  ran  more  frequently  into  hardening  reproduction 
constraints. 
  When  and  where  forced  resource  redeployment  does  not  work,  reforms  become 
instruments  to  reveal  and  extract  resources  and  to  recreate  the  structure's  lost  cohesion 
through  new  allocations.  Let  us  call  resource mobilizing  reforms  those  direct  or  indirect 
resource revealing actions that remain within the confines of the net.
5 With these instruments, 
resources formerly hidden may come to surface or units formerly passive become active.    
                                                        
5 For example, resources are mobilized within the net by decreasing the state's administrative role through the introduction of 
normative,  macro measures:  a  quasi   world  market  price  system,  revenue sharing  constructions,  or  income taxation  system, 
enterprise revenue system, reducing the role of compulsory planning, decentralizing decisions over input, output and commercial 
partners, over investment, import, export etc. Resources may be mobilized by narrowing the circle of selective allocation (e.g. 
narrowing the number of those privileged, altering the ratios of revenue sharing, increasing tax rates. It will render similar results 
if  the  attracting  and  resisting  capacity  of  sub units  is  decreased.  For  example,  this  happens  by  abolishing  of  branch  (line) 
ministries that mediated enterprise interests, or by depriving these latter of their interest promoting capacities and functions. 
Another way to reach that goal is the decentralization of the nomenklatura and appointment rights of enterprise managers to lower  
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However, owing to the strong attracting and resisting capacity of those fed back within the 
net, mobilized resources will be allocated invariably on the basis of politically rational criteria. 
Repeated direction of allocation contributed to the maintenance of fixed paths and the further 
strengthening of those privileged. Vicious cycle is developing through escalation of reforms6 
there is no capacity to abandon forced paths and political priorities of continuously increasing 
living  standards  that  gave  the  legitimacy  of  the  party  since  1957.7  Meanwhile,  reform 
escalation occurs without creating alternative resources and alternative rationality of behavior 
outside the net. The recurring drives for sustaining self reproduction with reforms gradually 
disintegrated the net8. When no further resources may be attracted or extracted in the given 
power  structure,  decentralization  of  interlinking  threads  accelerate,  extracting  discretion  is 
partially decentralized and drives to get rid of burdens increase. Simultaneously, efforts to 
create resources outside the net or attract from above strengthen. By that time though, in this 
structural pattern the condition of the structure deteriorates to such extent that cohesion may 
not be regenerated and system collapse takes place. Thus, Goulash Communism was created by 
the demands of the power structure and the same represented the traps that have lead to the 
loss of party legitimacy and political transformation. 
(iii)  The  third  type  of  pattern  will  be  called  self withdrawing  which  refers  also  to  the 
present Chinese pattern of power distribution. This pattern developed and stabilized during 
the frequent decentralizing centralizing campaigns of Mao from the end of the 1950s to the 
end of his power in 1976. It meant the decentralization of decision making power over resource 
extraction and distribution, supported by the decentralization of subordination of state owned 
enterprises. Decentralization followed size and administrative rank: the smaller the enterprise 
the lower the rank of the administrative level under which the enterprise was subordinated. By 
the time Deng Xiao Ping took over and decided on decentralizing reforms, the new pattern 
with  decentralized  distribution  of  power  was  institutionalized,  and  interests  towards 
decentralizing reforms that would increase decision making power of local administration had 
a  firm  background.  On  the  other  hand,  strong  resisting  capacities  towards  the  center  had 
evolved due to the alternative resources to central distribution and selective integration of 
provinces into the higher level decision making process.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
levels of the administration. Similar results may be achieved by weakening the bargaining capacity of the sub units themselves by 
disconnecting their feedbacks.  
6 The continuous drive for revealing and exploiting further resources to distribute may be accelerated further by the hardening of 
reproduction constraints from above or from outside the net. 
7 Csanádi, Party-states and their Legacies p. 229; Edward S. Steinfeld,. Forging Reform in China. The Fate of State Owned Industry 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.  1998),  p.  xiii xv,  3  and  pp.18 21;  Roger  H.  Gordon.  and  David  D.  Li.  “Government 
Distributional Concerns and Economic Policy During the Transition from Socialism” Transition Economics, N. 1662 Discussion paper 
series. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London (1997), p. 2. 
8 Growing difficulties will arise in maintaining traditional control through interlinking lines (D2) reaching out to the multitude of 
organizations, activities and positions. Moreover, the activity of using the net will decrease, since there are no expectable allocations 
through it while few alternatives emerge.  
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 Therefore, in this pattern interlinking threads are partially decentralized, so are resource 
extraction and allocation capacities, while there are strong economic feedbacks from several 
dimensions of the network for some enterprises and provinces. There is an increased resisting 
capacity to resource extraction and alternative to central resource distribution within the given 
pattern.  Under  these  circumstances  neither  forced  resource redeployment,  nor  resource 
mobilizing  efforts  within  the  network  are  sufficient  for  the  self reproduction  of  the  whole 
structure. During 1979 1992 overwhelmingly decentralizing (resource revealing) reforms within 
the net were implemented in China mirroring those in Hungary.  During this period one may 
detect overheated local investments, inflation and advantages of resource extraction of provinces 
to the detriment of central sources. As a reaction, one may perceive almost yearly repeated central 
retrenchments  to  halt  the  economically  disadvantageous  consequences  of  decentralization. 
Retrenchment  and  resource  centralization  fuel  efforts  to  get  rid  of  allocation  burdens  by 
continuously  decentralizing  allocation  responsibilities  (both  expenses  and  targets  of 
allocation). Besides decentralization, drives develop to leap out of the net for new resources to 
extract by allowing the increase of the economic field outside of the net. This was the process 
that is dated from Deng Xiao Ping’s round trip in south China in 1992. The round trip took 
place  in  the  aftermath  of  the  last  retrenchment  in  1989 90  combined  with  the  bitter 
experiences  of  the  Tiananmen  square  events  that  has  slowed  down  the  economy.  Reforms 
directed to the creation of new resources were twofold: on the one hand, measures were taken 
to encourage foreign and domestic investments outside the network, on the other hand, a tax 
reform was introduced in 1994 that shifted the ratio of local and central taxes to the advantage 
of the center. Complementing these ones, several other instruments were applied within the 
net allowing for resource centralization.     
Let  us  call  resource creating  reforms  those  measures  through  which  decision makers 
partially or completely "leap" out of the net, or let the field outside the net grow in order to 
acquire  new  resources
9.  This  process  increases  the  alternative  field  to  the  net  (alternative 
behavior, activity, organization, property resources and rationality) that makes the net relatively 
retreat
10, but it will retreat absolutely too from the economic sub field (see later). Thus, it was the 
structural specifics of power distribution that brought about the “Chinese Style” reforms keeping 
the legitimacy of the party by macro economic growth and rising living standards while ending up 
in economic transformation first. 
                                                        
9 For example, extractable resources are created by allowing increases in the number of resourceful units outside the net and the 
creation of the institutional conditions for this process. For example, letting the exchange of over the plan products on market 
prices, to increase revenues outside the net, to enhance conditions for domestic and foreign private ventures, enhance private plot 
cultivation, to abolish collectives and cooperatives, setting up domestic private enterprises, encouraging the settlement of foreign 
funded  enterprises.  Allowing  the  "entrance"  of  resources  from  outside  the  net,  by  attracting  FDI for  creating  joint ventures, 
transforming SOEs into shareholding enterprises for foreign and domestic private capital infiltration, lifting up barriers to labor 
mobility, price setting and product and capital flow  etc. 
10 Naughton calls the relative growth of non state sector as "growing out of the plan" in John McMillan and Barry Naughton, “How 
to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 8. Spring  (1992), pp. 130 143. 
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  Concluding the above, we have seen that pattern specifics will bring about pattern 
conforming instruments of resource extraction and distribution serving self reproduction that 
reflects the distribution of power within the system. This is how the pattern that evolved in 
Hungary  during  1957  and  1963  brought  about  the  decentralizing  and  resource revealing 
reforms within the network with growing living standards called “Goulash Communism”. On 
the  other  hand,  the  pattern  that  evolved  and  stabilized  between  1957  and  1976  in  China 
induced, besides decentralizing reforms, the development and dominance of resource creating 
reforms accompanied by growing living standards that acquired the name of “Chinese style 
reforms”. Both dominant reforms and the acceleration of their implementation willingly or 
unwillingly  paved  the  way  of  the  different  sequences  of  system  transformation:  political 
transformation first in Hungary and economic transformation first in China. How could such 
different transformation occur? 
3. THE DYNAMICS OF TRANSFORMATION 
Dynamics within the net are not independent from that outside of it. External factors have a 
substantive  impact  on  the  conditions  of  self reproduction.  These  factors  or  their  absence 
influence transitory or definite restructuring within the net. The impact of external factors and 
response to those depends primarily on the pattern of power while strategies are secondary. 
This is because the room for maneuver of strategies is constrained by the possibility, interests 
and conditions within the pattern, though interacting with it. If structural constraints are met 
and  resources  from  higher  aggregation  flow  poorly,  reproduction  constraints  within  the 
pattern become hard and exposure to external factors arise. In those cases the importance of 
the constraints exerted from outside the net emerges.  
Hardening reproduction constraints from within and hardening budget constraints exerted 
from  outside  the  network  if  occur  simultaneously,  adaptive  drives  intensify,  pattern 
conforming  measures  accelerate  and  pattern conforming  transformation  process  will  take 
place.  
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Based on the above, we may now define in more detail the disparities of transformation in 
the model’s approach. We shall focus on the following questions:  
Figure 6.  




The definition of transformation in the analytical approach of the model is the following: 
the party state network is retreating as a social system from monopolized sub spheres, while 
outside of the net the sub spheres of a new social system are emerging (Figure 6). The nature 
of these two tendencies may be different. It may involve absolute and relative retreat of the 
network.  Absolute  retreat  occurs  when  elements  of  the  network,  their  functions  and  their 
impact decline. Relative retreat evolves in relationship to the higher speed of development of 
the emergent sub sphere compared to that of the network.  
However,  both  retreat  and  emergence  are  pattern-dependent  that  influence  the 
characteristics  of  the  transformation  process.  Specifics  of  such  path dependency  evolve  in 
several  dimensions:  (1) according  to  the  differences  among  patterns;  (2)  the  disparities  of 
power  distribution  within  patterns;  (3)  the  different  interplay  among  intertwined  patterns 
(similar or disparate) of different levels of aggregation. Intensity of influence will depend on 
the density and depth and extent of centralization or decentralization of intertwining lines of 
dependence,  the  distribution  of  power  of  higher  and  lower  level  aggregations.  These 
characteristics may mutually speed up or slow down the process of retreat and emergence; (4) 
Finally,  path dependency  is  also  the  result  of  the  combination of the actual  importance of 
different composing factors of the process of retreat and emergence.  
All of the above four characteristics of pattern conforming path dependency will influence 
where, how and with what sequence, speed, conditions and outcome will pattern dependent  
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transformation occur. The interplay of the above pattern conforming characteristics with local 
individual  traits  will  jointly  define  the  concrete  outcome  of  the  process  of  transformation. 
Pattern characteristics  will  also  influence  the  adapting  capacity  of  actors  during  the 
transformation process. Next we shall detail only two of the above four specifics that are crucial 
for our present arguments focusing on the differences between the transformation of Chinese 
and Hungarian party states.  
 
4. IMPACT OF PATTERN DISPARITIES ON THE TRANSFORMATION 
The  IPS  model  suggest  that  path dependency  will  emerge  due  to  the  different  pattern 
dynamics resulting (a) in the different sequence of transformation of political and economic 
subfields, (b) in the different pace of the retreat of the net from monopolized sub fields and 
emergence of the field outside the network, concluding in (c) the different political conditions 
of economic transformation and different economic conditions of political transformation.  
In  the  Chinese  case,  pattern conforming  characteristics  of  transformation  due  to  the 
impact  of  resource creating  reforms  outside  the  network  are  the  following:  economic 
transformation comes first, either followed or not by political transformation. The retreat of 
the  net  and  the  emergence  of  the  new  economic  sub sphere  is  gradual,  economic 
transformation occurs under authoritarian political regime, accompanied by macroeconomic 
growth (essentially due to the economic field outside the net) (Figure 7.). 
Figure 7.  
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Due to the authoritarian political conditions the retreat and emergence in the economic 
subfield  is  accompanied  by  the  following  phenomena:  In  the  stretched  out  transformation 
process intensive traffic of actors and capital in  and out of the net prevails. There is a potential 
threat  of  the  long term  stabilization  of  rent seeking  behavior,  corruption  and  a  steady 
stripping of the public values of the net through capital, manpower, elite and organization 
flight. This process might also enhance a network selected and dependent private sphere on 
short term  interests.  Authoritarian  conditions  also  encourage  the  infiltration  and 
institutionalization  of  criminal  networks  and  organized  crime.  These  activities  benefit  the 
monopolized closed channels of interest promotion of the party state network. Institutional 
and horizontal organizations to control changes are lacking. Labor force is exposed, chances 
for institutional voicing are lacking, both in the state and the concurrent private sector. Thus, 
open  mass  grievances  due  to  corruption  or  other  economic  and  social  reasons  increase  in 
number, scope and mass.
11  
However,  the  same  stretched  out  process  under  authoritarian  conditions  provides  the 
opportunity  to  smoothen  the  retreat  of  the  net,  keep  overall  political  stability.  Gradual 
transformation provides also an opportunity for a gradual economic and political pluralization 
within the network. Pluralization is caused by the infiltration of private capital in the state 
owned  sector  and  capitalists  in  the  network.  There  is  a  steady  macroeconomic  growth, 
overwhelmingly due to the emerging field outside the net owing to the constant infiltration of 
foreign capital and increasing domestic capital investments. Meanwhile, there is a selective 
economic decline within the network chances for bailing out larger loss making SOEs narrow. 
Thus, prospects of massive and concentrated lay offs strengthen, revenue disparities at several 
dimensions  widen,  the  party’s  mass  and  economic  basis  in  SOEs  and  joint  ventures  is 
narrowing. However, until macroeconomic growth is secured party legitimacy is kept. But as 
soon as growth declines, economic and social tensions may sharpen and legitimacy may suffer.  
In  the  case  of  Hungary,  political  transformation  comes  first  owing  to the  loss  of  party 
legitimacy  due  to  the  inefficiency  of  resource revealing  (decentralizing)  reforms  and 
exhaustion  of  foreign  resources  (see  Figure  8.).  Economic  transformation  follows  political 
transformation, thus, this latter occurs under democratic political regime. The retreat of the 





                                                        
11
 Yongshun Cai, “Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 
03. (2008), pp. 411-432  
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Figure 8.  
System transformation in Hungary: transformation of the political sub-field first 
 
 
Sequence also determines economic conditions during political transformation: There is a 
steady economic decline, indebtedness, and growth of the volume of loss making enterprises. 
Restriction spiral that de legitimates the communist party despite accelerating decentralizing 
reforms  makes  the  network  retreat  gradually  from  political  sub sphere.  Horizontal 
organizations and new parties form under conditions of macro economic imbalances. Since 
decentralizing reforms within the net did not create private sphere, domestic private capital is 
lacking.  There  is  no  domestic  economic  force  that  could  equilibrate  incomes,  introduce 
alternative capital, behavior and interest, provide new workplaces, decrease budget deficit and 
form  electoral base  for newly  emerging  parties.  The  fluidity of  the  political,  economic  and 
social structure is general:
12 institutions, functions, positions, parties, horizontal organizations, 
rules and laws are frequently changing. Fluidity enhances cumulated uncertainty. There are 
social  grievances,  regionally  concentrated  mass  unemployment  due  to  the  close downs  or 
privatization  of  loss making  large  enterprises  that  increase  political  conflicts.  Frequently 
changing institutions, functions, internal distribution of tasks and staff hinders information 
and  transparency  during  privatization  and  FDI  inflow,  attracts  short term  interests. 
Meanwhile,  former  elite’s  positional  advantages  the  preservation  of  fragmented  but  steady 
networks contribute to the insiders’ information and wealth acquisition.  
Critical  economic  conditions,  cumulated  uncertainty  during  transformation,  volatile 
electorate and, inexperienced elite are aggravating political transformation. These factors are 
adding to the weaknesses and to political swings of elected parties and governments. Several 
                                                        
12 Valerie Bunce and Maria Csanádi. “Uncertainty in the Transition. Post-Communism in Hungary,” East European Politics and Society, Vol. 7., 
No. 2. Spring (1993), pp. 240-275. 
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party splits occur due to the initial phase of their formation. Governments and programs are 
changing relatively frequently due to economic crisis. Thus, governing parties soon lose social 
trust and popularity, due to economic crisis, unrealistic hopes, uncontrollable fast changes, 
frequently modified decisions and frequent policy swings. 
Based  on  the  above  approach,  we  could  define  why  “Goulash  communism”  owing  to 
pattern specifics of self reproduction and external pressure of expiring Western loans ended in 
political transformation first. We have shown under what economic conditions this occurred 
and  how  political  conditions  of  the  newly  emerging  political  sub field  influenced  the  sub 
sequent economic transformation.  
5. FACTORS WITHIN THE PROCESS OF RETREAT AND EMERGENCE  
The ingredient factors of the process of retreat and emergence and their different combination 
will influence the ways the transformation occurs within each pattern. Similarly, the processes 
of  transformation  of  a  given  subfield  raise  similar  problems  and  incite  similar  solutions 
(Csanádi, 2006). However, the scale of impact will be strongly influenced by pattern specifics, 
the  sequence,  speed  and  conditions  of  system  transformation  and  the  combination  of  the 
variety  of  the  composing  elements  of  retreat  and  emergence  as  well  as  individual 
characteristics. The different combination of the inherent factors of the transformation will 
interact and thus reinforce or slow down mutual dynamics.  
Let us see the components of the economic transformation through the absolute retreat of 
the network from economic sub field and the emergence of a new economic sub field outside 
of it at the example of China (Figure 9. and 10.).  
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Figure 9.  
Components of the process of retreat of the network in China 
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Figure  9.  reflects  the  factors  of  the  absolute  retreat  of  the  net.  These  factors  will 
characterize  the  transformation  since  they  may  strengthen  in  different  sequences,  or 
simultaneously,  or  in  different  combinations.  Due  to  frequently  hardening  reproduction 
constraints of the network in China decisions over allocation, price, investment, extractions are 
decentralized while revenues and revenue sources are siphoned away. This process may occur 
directly,  by  deliberately  withdrawing  interlinking   and  hierarchical  lines  (for  example,  the 
withdrawal  of  the  net  from  below  county  level  through  semi free  governor  elections  on 
township  level  in  China.
13  The  network  may  be  withdrawn  also  by  abolishing  former 
distributive functions and organizations dealing with resource distribution and decisions over 
allocation and allowing investments or by elevating the threshold of administrative (official) 
consent  for  investments.  Thus,  hierarchical  lines  of  command  are  shortened  and  lines 
interlinking functions and organizations are also withdrawn. Another reason for the absolute 
retreat of the net is the attractiveness of the alternative options of resource acquisition outside the 
                                                        
13 Hairong Lai, “Development of Competitive Elections since mid 1990s on Township Level in Sichuan Province in China.”, China 
Perspectives (Hong Kong), Vol. 51, January February (2004),  pp. 13 27.; Ding Shuhfan, “The Party state Relationship in China, 
1978 1986.”,  (Dissertation  submitted  to  the  Graduate  School  of  the  University  of  Notre  Dame,  in  Partial  Fulfillment  of  the 
Requirements for the degree of PhD, Dept. of Gov. and International Studies, UND. June 1987), p.32, fn. 18 
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net. Options will motivate decision makers to partially or definitely exit
14 the network, vacate the 
rigid  structures  and  to  leave  burdens  within  the  net  that  incites  further  decentralization.
15 
Burdens may be get rid of by cutting them off the net. This event occurs when the economic units 
embraced  by  hierarchical  and  interlinking  lines  disappear  from  the  end  of  the  through 
bankruptcy and close down or privatization of SOEs
16 and TVEs. The network may also weaken 
by attracting resources from outside the net (such as FDI
17), integrating alternative interests, 
alternative behavior and capital that will decrease the political influence through the hierarchical 
and interlinking dependency lines.
18 The network – both hierarchical, interlinking lines and 
feedbacks – were streamlined for purposes of rationalization that weaken their density and 
accumulation declining the capacity for interest promotion. 
 These actions have several consequences: they decrease the number of sub units attached to 
the net and in exchange, increase the amount of redistributable resources to the remaining sub 
units within the net, and also may provide the unit with resourceful entities outside the net. 
Moreover, because of available alternative resources, the intensity of using the net also decreases.  
                                                        
14 This may occur either individually: Gordon, and Li, Government Distributional Concerns  p.1 2 and 23), or as an organization 
Yingyi Qian, “Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control” Economics of Transition, Vol. 4 N. 2, (1996), 
pp. 427 47, p. 430,  
Russel Smyth,. “Recent Developments in Rural Enterprise Reform in China: Achievements, Problems and Prospects.”  Asian 
Survey, Vol 38. N. 8, (1998), pp.784 800 and p. 798.  
15 E.g. in the form of daughter enterprises which than found joint ventures with private ones). Qian, “Enterprise Reform in China”, p. 
431 
16 According to the utilization of resources earned from privatization, resources may be re deployed if used for the subsidization of 
remaining SOEs, or social causes, and may end in resource creation if invested in joint ventures or infrastructure or shares in 
private enterprises. Meanwhile, privatization decreases subjects for resource extraction within the net. 
17  Yanrui  Wu,  (ed.).  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  Economic  Growth  in  China  New  Horizons  in  International  Business, 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 1999); Yasheng Huang, “Internal and External Reforms: Experiences and Lessons 
from China.” Part I. ChinaOnline News. Sept. 20, (2000). 
18 Margareth M. Pearson, China's New Business Elite. The Political Consequences of Economic Reforms (University of California Press: 
Berkeley, L. A. London, 1997) 
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Figure 10.   




How did relative withdrawal of the net, that is, the emergence of the new economic sub 
field occur? The higher is the expectations for harder reproduction constraints within the net 
the more intensive the pressure to decentralize and to leap out of the net. This drive will cause 
the escalation of resource creating reforms. Emergence of the economic sub sphere outside the 
net occurs as a result of allowing over the plan production to be sold at market prices both in 
the industrial and agricultural spheres. The increase of the number of economic units and 
capital  outside  the  net  was  allowed.  Growing  number  of  enterprises  prior  attached  to  the 
network now privatized. The results of the increase of the transfer (stripped) of convertible 
capacity (manpower, capital, organization, production) from the net outside of it. This drive is 
reinforced if chances for resource attraction through the network decline. The scope of the 
overlapping segment of the network and the emerging field widens through joint ventures or 
joint stock companies with private majority share.  
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Figure 11. 




Tables 11. and 12. show the elements of political transformation that occurred in Hungary. 
Hardening reproduction constraints of the system have driven decision makers in the party to 
get rid of burdens by decentralizing the discretion over interlinking lines in the party that 
reached economic decision making processes. The party itself weakened its influence within 
economic units by abolishing full time position of party secretaries and subordinating them to 
enterprise managers by nominating them part time. Declining influence and legitimacy of the 
party enhanced the emptying of the structure: growing number of party members quit the 
party due to disillusions, declining privileges and alternative options; also staff members are 
quitting  party  positions  to  public  or  private  spheres;  not  only  actors  leave  but  also  the 
interactivity  through  network  gradually  vanishes  due  to  the  declining  capacity  of  resource 
distribution.  There  was  a  clear  withdrawal  of  vertical  and  interlinking  lines  due  to  the 
introduction  of  multi candidate  elections  in  several  fields:  at  local  governments,  in  the 
nomination  of  enterprise  managers,  to  the  parliament  and  to  the  party  central  committee 
membership.  Towards  the  end  of  1988,  the  interlinking  threads  were  already  incapable  of 
"covering" the economic sphere, let alone the social and political spheres.  In response to all these 
changes, pressures and instability, in October 1988, the Politburo displayed increasing tolerance 
towards emerging new political and economic interest groups. It set very easy criteria for the 
acceptance  of  alternative  movements  by  the  party  and  allowed  party  members  to  join  these  
  26 
movements.
19 Indeed, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) even offered them political 
alliance.   
  At its meeting in early February 1989, the CC made an historic admission: it declared that 
it regarded the events of 1956 as a popular uprising, not as a counter revolution, in which the 
forces of democratic socialism were also present.
20 This announcement retrospectively called into 
question the legitimacy of the system, given the bloody repression of the 1956 uprising with the 
help of Soviet military forces. At this mid February meeting the CC recorded that the HSWP had 
renounced its claim to being in a leading role, and had declared that it wished to be a political 
party.  In March, the Budapest PC suggested the total abolition of the nomenklatura system.
21  In 
April it had also publicly defended the developing horizontal organizations of the various kinds of 
reform  groups  within  the  party,
22  though  these  were  incompatible  with  the  principles  of 
hierarchy.  This also led to the reluctant acceptance of the principle of competing platforms which 
had been rejected outright earlier. 
  In May 1989, the CC initiated the total abolition of the nomenklatura system.  It declared 
that it wanted to practice its jurisdiction over party positions only. It also called for the reversal of 
its earlier decision on the party leadership over the workers' militia — which was its armed force 
established in 1956.
23 With these steps the legitimacy of party groupings within organizations was 
further weakened, as was that of the workers’militia funded in 1957.  The suggestion to shift the 
headquarters from enterprises to territorial organizations, however, still faced resistance. The 
greatest — and well founded — fear of the party organizations in shifting the scope of membership 
registration from enterprise to territory was that in the event of territorial organization, they 
would lose a large proportion of their membership.  As a result of the process of retreat, Party 
as  a  social  system  was  withdrawn  from  political  and  economic  subfields,  abolished  as  a 
hegemonic party and reborn as a political entity in a de monopolized political sub field. 
Parallel to the gradual retreat of the network from the political sub sphere, a new political 
sub field was emerging outside the net (Figure 12). 
                                                        
19 "The October 4, 1988 meeting of the HSWP PC", in Népszabadság, 5 October 1988. 
20 "The February 10 11, 1989 meeting of the CC", in Népszabadság, 13 February 1989. 
21 "Interview with the First Secretary of the Budapest PC", in Népszabadság, 18 March 1989. 
22  Arguments about political initiatives, criticism, freedom of opinion, intra party debates, and the freedom of platform formation. Party   
Debates, (HSWP CC Department of Propaganda and Canvassing, 1989, No. 3). 
23 "The May 3, 1989 meeting of the CC", in Magyar Nemzet, 10 May 1989.  
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Figure 12.   




Growing number of horizontal groups outside the net was allowed to form: first NGOs of 
various  kinds  emerged  with  non political  scope.  Formation  of  various  interest  groups  was 
allowed to organize both on economic, public and political subfields. In unison with its meeting 
in early February 1989, when the CC accepted the need for political pluralization and a multi-
party system, interest groups were transformed into parties. Former communist party members, 
who quit the party joined the new interest groups and later new parties. At the behest of the 
increasingly vocal opposition groups and the internal opposition of the HSWP itself, negotiations 
began  in  May  1989  between  the  government  and  the  new  political  groups.  The  talks  gained 
increasingly more weight, and legitimacy gradually shifted from Parliament to the scene of these 
negotiations.
24    Within  weeks,  the  agreements  reached  here  became  important  items  on  the 
Parliament's agenda.  No longer could Parliament debate bills without these having first been 
passed and/or amended by this extra Parliamentary forum.  Noteworthy among these were the 
amendments  to  the  constitution  and  the  so called  crucial  laws  formulated  through  tough 
negotiations: the freedom of information law, the party law, the electoral law, and many other 
important amendments to current laws.
25  
   
                                                        
24 The participants of the National Round Table Conference were: 1) The HSWP, 2) The new opposition parties, 3) The trade unions, 
together with old and new social organizations (Vigh, 1989). 
25 Report on the June 27 30 1989 session of Parliament, in dailies Magyar Nemzet and Népszabadság, July 1 1989.  
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Following the agreements, the remaining threads holding the structure together became 
strikingly contradictory to the accepted changes. During the first eight months of 1989, 68,000 
people left the HSWP, whereas only 2,600 entered, leaving 725,000 party members out of the 
790,000 of the previous year.26 
Political transformation with the formation of new parties, the emptying and withdrawal of 
the HSWP and the introduction of the new political structure went rapidly and smoothly given the 
pre empting gradual weakening and disintegration of Party power. The HSWP congress voted for 
the transformation of the Party into a political entity, and with the active support of the reformist 
wing it dissolved itself. The last party congress was held in early October 1989.  The delegates 
recognized  and  declared  the  end  of  the  monopolized  power  relations,  and  disassociated 
themselves from the former methods of management, power, and control.  On the fourth day, the 
reform  wing  of  the  delegates  or,  more  specifically,  reform  communist  leaders  succeeded  in 
convincing  the  participants  on  issues  of  reform.  The  reform  platform  pushed  through  the 
democratization of the party rules of organization, the approval of a short, socialist inspired party 
program,  the  abolition of  the  HSWP  and  its  apparatus,  and  the formation  of the  Hungarian 
Socialist Party (HSP) as its official (legal) successor. The distribution of Party property was also 
put on the agenda and free election was put in process. 
Free  elections  were  held,  and  six  parties  succeeded  in  joining  the  parliament.
27  The 
conservative left, overwhelmingly formed by the aged members of the dissolved HSWP did not 
achieve the minimum quota (four per cent) to enter the parliament. The reform communists 
became a small parliamentary opposition party after free elections. The first government was 
formed by the conservative right wing of the former dissidents. 
                                                        
26 Népszabadság, October 4 1989. 
27 These parties were the conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum, two traditional parties that had historical background in 
pre  and post World War II period, the Smallholders and the Social Democrats, the successor Socialist Party, and two liberal 
parties, the Young Democrats and the Free Democrats.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Chinese and Hungarian party state systems, despite their huge individual disparities in size, in 
geopolitical  location,  economic  structure,  cultural  and  historical  traditions  etc.  may  be 
compared based on their common systemic characteristics demonstrated by the IPS model. 
The common traits interact with different characteristics of the pattern of power distribution 
and individual specifics. They will jointly determine the varieties of the structure, operation 
and  of  system  transformation  in  time  and  space.  Disparities  in  the  pattern  of  power 
distribution bring about different resisting capacities to resource extraction. This will require 
the implementation of pattern conforming, instruments of self reproduction (extraction and 
allocation) of the system. Such were the decentralizing reforms from above within the network 
in  Hungary,  and  the  decentralizing  and  resource  creating  reforms  within  and  outside  the 
network in China. “Goulash Communism” in Hungary, which meant a steady increase in living 
standards combined with decentralizing reforms in the economy should be dated to the period 
of pattern conforming self reproduction of the Hungarian party state system until the second 
half  of  1980s, when  economic  crisis,  retrenchment  spiral  and  the  exhaust  of  foreign  loans 
together  exerted  pressure  for  adaptation  and  decreased  party  legitimacy.  “Chinese  style 
reforms” became characteristic from early 1990s, when resource creating reforms outside the 
network  accelerated,  contributing  to  macro economic  growth  and  party  legitimacy. 
Characteristic operation and instruments within patterns do not change substantially in time 
even  under  adaptation  pressures.  Instead,  they  escalate  with  the  growing  pressures  from 
within and outside the network. Thus, while supporting the self reproduction of the system 
they  simultaneously  contribute  to  its  transformation.  Transformation  will  be  pattern 
conforming: it will define the disparities in the sequence, speed and political conditions of 
economic  transformation  and  economic  conditions  of  political  of  transformation.  These 
characteristics  explain  why  Hungarian  „Goulash  Communism”  ended  up  in  declining 
legitimacy of the party and political transformation first accompanied by economic crisis, while 
economic  transformation  occurred  second,  under  democratic  regime  while  we  find  the 
specifics  of  the  „Chinese  style”  in  economic  transformation  first  accompanied  by 
macroeconomic growth under authoritarian regime, with political transformation second in 
the waiting. Choices of sequence and conditions are structurally constrained. Differences in the 
combination of composing elements of the process of retreat of the network and the emergence 
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